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The impact of news surprises on exchange rates depends in principle upon a number of 
factors including the state of the economy, institutional setting and nature of the expected 
policy response. These characteristics may lead to state-contingent asymmetric responses to 
news. In this paper we investigate the possible asymmetric response of intraday exchange 
rates (5-minute intraday JPY/USD) to macroeconomic news announcements during a very 
unusual period—Japan during 1999-2006 when the money market  interest rate was 
effectively zero. We may think of this period as a “natural experiment” consisting of an 
institutional setting when interest rates may rise but not decline, thereby constraining both 
endogenous policy reactions to news and private market  expectations. Asymmetric 
responses to news, to the extent that they are important in exchange rate markets as they are 
in equity markets, would seem particularly likely to be evident during this period. We 
consider several ways asymmetric responses may be  manifested and linked to 
macroeconomic news during the zero-interest rate period. We assess whether the intraday 
exchange rate responds differently depending on whether the news is emanating from Japan 
or the U.S; we consider the state of the business cycle; and we distinguish between “good” 
and “bad” news. 
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1.  Introduction 
Recent research on the influence of U.S. macroeconomic news surprises on the dynamics 
of intraday exchange rates offers important insights regarding how quickly exchange rate 
markets react to macro news and which macro news are essential for explaining exchange 
rate movements (see, for example, Andersen et al., 2003 and 2007; Chaboud et al., 2004; 
Dominguez  and  Panthaki,  2006;  and  Faust  et  al.,  2005).  Generally,  these  intraday 
exchange rate studies suggest that stronger than expected U.S. economic activity and 
higher than expected inflation tends to appreciate the USD, and, furthermore, that U.S. 
news produces conditional mean jumps in the exchange rate. 
The  impact  of  news  surprises  on  exchange  rates  depends  in  principle  upon  a 
number of factors including the state of the economy, institutional setting and nature of 
the expected policy response, e.g. Clarida and Waldman (2007) and  Engel et al. (2007).
1 
These characteristics may lead to state -contingent asymmetric responses  of exchange 
rates  to  news.  Policy  and  private  sector  responses  may  be  complicated  and  vary 
depending  on  factors  such  as  t he  state  of  the  business  cycle,  the  nature  of  the 
macroeconomic news (e.g. ―good‖ or ―bad‖ news), and the (country) source of the news. 
Asymmetric responses are even more likely in particular institutional settings such as an 
environment with effectively zero short-term interest rates. Lower interest rates (below 
zero) are not feasible during this circumstance and hence monetary policy is not able to 
endogenously  absorb shocks  to  certain  news announcements, thereby  limiting private 
sector expectations of policy reactions. Given the close linkages between interest rates 
                                                 
1  These  authors  emphasize  how  expectations  regarding  central  bank  policy  responses  to  inflation  are 
formed in the context of exchange rate models.  
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and exchanges rates, such constraints, in turn, are likely to make the response to news in 
the foreign exchange market state contingent. 
 Despite its theoretical importance, the empirical intraday literature on exchange 
rates  has  paid  relatively  little  attention  to  whether  the  exchange  rate  response  to 
macroeconomic news is asymmetric or state dependent across different dimensions. This 
is surprising since in investigations of macroeconomic news and assets prices, other than 
exchange rates, state dependence has been shown to be important (e.g. Andersen et al., 
2007;  Basistha  and  Kurov,  2008;  Flannery  and  Protopapadakis,  2002;  McQueen  and 
Roley, 1993). In the context of equity markets and news, for example, McQueen and 
Roley (1993) have shown that the effect of news on stock prices is asymmetric in that it 
varies with the stages of the business cycle and that the equity price response may depend 
on whether a given news variable is conveying ―good‖ or ―bad‖ news about the state of 
the economy.
2 These results for equity returns are confirmed and extended in Flannery 
and Protopapadakis (2002). Basistha and Kurov (2008) find  that the response of U.S. 
equity returns to monetary news surprises is much st ronger during recessions and tight 
credit conditions.  
We investigate the possible asymmetric response of intraday exchange rates (5 -
minute  intraday  JPY/USD)  to  macroeconomic  news  announcements  during  a  very 
                                                 
2 Using daily data, McQueen and Roley (1993) show that news regarding unexpectedly strong economic 
activity in the U.S. has a positive effect on the S&P 500 index when business conditions are weak, but a 
negative effect when business conditions are strong. They attribute this asymmetry to differences in the 
response of discount rates relative to expected cash flows given different states of the economy. They argue 
that studies not accounting for differences in the business cycle may lead to an underestimation of the 
effects of announcement surprises. Andersen et al. (2007) consider the possible asymmetric effects of U.S. 
news  surprises  across  different  stages  of  the  U.S.  business  cycle.  They  note  that  the  effects  of  U.S. 
macroeconomic news on equities and bonds react differently depending on the state of the U.S. business 
cycle and, therefore, correlations averaged over the business cycle are typically low. They do not make this 




unusual  period  -  Japan  during  1999-2006  when  the  money  market  interest  rate  was 
effectively zero (figure 1). Asymmetric responses to news, to the extent that they are 
important in exchange rate markets as they are in equity markets, would seem particularly 
likely to be evident during this period, i.e. we may think of this period as a ―natural 
experiment‖ consisting of an institutional setting where interest rates may rise but not 
decline, thereby limiting the policy response to news announcements and, as a result, 
limiting  private  market  expectations  of  endogenous  policy  actions.  In  such  an 
institutional setting, the exchange rate is more likely to exhibit asymmetric responses to 
news compared to the environments that Andersen et al. (2007) consider, in which they 
do not find state contingent impacts of news on exchange rates.
3 
How might these state dependencies be distinguished?  We consider three ways 
that state dependencies and asymmetric responses  of intraday exchange rates  may be 
manifested and linked to macroeconomic news : (1) whether the news emanates from 
Japan or the U.S.; (2) the state of the business cycle; and (3) differences between ―good‖ 
and ―bad‖ news. Accordingly, our first research question pertains to whether both U.S. 
and Japanese macro news surprises influence the JPY/USD exchange rate, i.e. whether 
Japanese news matter and, if so, which Japanese news are important and how do their 
relative influence compare to the relative influence of U.S. news.
4 The second research 
question pertains to whether news has asymmetric exchange rate effects across different 
stages of the business cycle. Since our data set of macro news surprises for both the U.S. 
and Japan spans different combinations of U.S. and Japan business cycle upturns and 
                                                 
3 Andersen et al. (2007) do not consider Japanese news announcements. 
4  Other studies that take into account Japanese macro news when analyzing the intraday JPY/USD 
exchange rate include Cai et al. (2001), Clarida and Waldman (2007), Ito and Roley (1987), and Melvin 
and Yin (2000). See Almeida et al. (1998), Andersen et al. (2003), and Bauwens et al. (2005) for studies 
that consider the intraday exchange rate response to both U.S. and European macroeconomic news.  
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downturns,  we  are  able  to  assess  if  business  cycle  asymmetries  are  present  in  our 
exchange rate context. Finally, our third research question is whether ―good‖ and ―bad‖ 
(positive and negative) news exert asymmetric intraday effects on the exchange rate, e.g. 
is the absolute magnitude of the exchange rate movement attributed to a positive (i.e. 
better than expected) Japanese GDP surprise different than the absolute magnitude of the 
movement associated with a negative (i.e. worse than expected) Japanese GDP surprise.  
We shed light on these possible asymmetries by analyzing the real-time (intraday) 
effects  of  both  U.S.  and  Japanese  macroeconomic  news  surprises  on  the  JPY/USD 
exchange  rate  over  the  1  January  1999  to  31  October  2006  time-period.  News  data 
consisting  of  a  large  number  of  time-stamped  U.S.  and  Japanese  macroeconomic 
announcements  and  preceding  survey  expectations  obtained  from  Bloomberg  News 
Service, along with indicative 5-minute spot JPY/USD exchange rate quotes, facilitate 
our investigation. Both U.S. and Japanese news surprises are measured as the difference 
between the macroeconomic announcement and the median value of the immediately 
preceding Bloomberg News Service survey of market expectations regarding the given 
announcement.
5 
For our baseline estimations, we estimate the exchange rate response to news  
surprises using only observations within 10 -minutes before and 90-minutes after each 
announcement.  To  accommodate  the long memory and the intraday periodicity that 
characterize our intraday JPY/USD exchange rate data, we estimate our baseline models 
using heteroskedasticity and serial-correlation robust (HAC) standard errors. To ensure 
the  robustness  of  our  results  we  also  carry  out  estimations  that  include   all  the 
                                                 
5 Fatum and Scholnick (2008) show that failure to disentangle the expected component of news may lead to 
an underestimation of the impact of news.  
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observations in our sample and, furthermore, we re-estimate the baseline model using the 
two-step weighted least squares (2WLS) estimation.
6 
The following two sections discuss our data and our econometric methodology, 
respectively.  Section  4  presents  the  baseline  results,  the  methodological  robustness 
checks, and assessment of asymmetries. Section 5 summarizes our results and concludes. 
 
2. Data 
The intraday JPY/USD exchange rate data is provided by Olsen and Associates, collected 
from commercial banks by Tenfore and Oanda, and covers the 1 January 1999 to 31 
October 2006 time-period. The data consists of the bid and the offer spot exchange rate at 
the end of every 5-minute interval over every 24-hour period. The quotes are indicative 
quotes, i.e. not necessarily traded quotes. We filter the data for anomalies and bad quotes 
following the procedure of Dacorogna et al. (1993). 
  Our midpoint (log) exchange rate price at each 5-minute point is constructed by 
linearly interpolating the average of the preceding and immediately following (log) bid 
and offer quotes. The continuously compounded 5-minute returns ( t R ) are calculated as 
the  change  in  the  5-minute  midpoint  prices.
7  Consistent  with  the existing  intraday 
literature on widely traded currency pairs we define a trading day to start at 21.05 GMT 
the night before and end at 21.00 GMT on the evening of the trading day in question (see 
Bollerslev and Domowitz, 1993) and, furthermore, we define a weekend to start at 21.05 
GMT Friday and finish at 21.00 GMT Sunday. 
                                                 
6 Our baseline estimation procedure follows Andersen et al. (2007). The 2WLS estimation procedure is 
described in Andersen and Bollerslev (1998). 
7 Goodhart et al. (1996) show that 5-minute returns constructed from indicative quotes closely resemble 5-
minute returns constructed from transaction prices.  
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  Our news data consists of a large number of time-stamped Japanese and U.S. 
macroeconomic  announcements  and  preceding  survey  expectations  obtained  from 
Bloomberg News Service.
8 We include in our analysis Japanese news variables that are 
largely comparable to the U.S. news variables that are significant in either the time-series 
analysis or the event study analysis of Andersen et al. (2003) in their investigation of the 
JPY/USD exchange rate. In addition, we consider surprises regarding Japanese news of 
particular  interest,  e.g.  surprises  regarding  the  Bank  of  Japan‘s  TANKAN  survey 
variables.
9  We  include  U.S.  news  variables  that  Andersen  et  al.  (2003)  find  to 
significantly  influence  the  JPY/USD  exchange  rate ,  and  we  also  take  into  account 
additional  ―usual  suspects‖  variables  such  as  surprises  regarding  U.S.  consumer  and 
producer  price  indices.  Consequently,  our  data  includes  announcements  and  survey 
expectations regarding 16 types of Japanese macro news and 19 types of U.S. macro 
news.  The  Japanese  news  variables  are  GDP  (quarterly),  GDP  (annual),  Industrial 
Production, Capacity Utilization, Construction Orders, Overall Spending, Large Retail 
Sales, Trade Balance, Current Account, Retail Trade, Consumer Price Index, Consumer 
Confidence  Index,  TANKAN  Large  Manufacturing  Index,  TANKAN  Non-
Manufacturing  Index,  Leading  Economic  Index,  and  Monetary  Base.  The  U.S.  news 
variables  are  GDP,  Non-Farm  Payroll  Employment,  Industrial  Production,  Capacity 
Utilization, Personal Income, Consumer Credit, Consumer Spending, New Home Sales, 
Durable Good Orders, Factory Orders, Business Inventories, Trade Balance, Producer 
                                                 
8 Japanese macro announcements are available from Bloomberg News Service as well as from the data 
banks of the Bank of Japan and the Japanese Cabinet Office. 
9  The Bank of Japan website at  www.boj.or.jp/en/theme/research/stat/tk/index.htm  provides details (in 
English) regarding the TANKAN survey variables.  
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Price Index, Consumer Price Index, Consumer Confidence Index, NAPM Index, Housing 
Starts, Index of Leading Indicators, and Target Federal Funds Rate. 
  Consistent with the recent literature on exchange rates and news, for each of the 
macroeconomic announcements in our data we define a news surprise as the difference 
between the macroeconomic announcement and the preceding survey expectation of that 
announcement. Subsequently, we standardize each news surprise series in order to allow 
for a comparison of the relative influences of different types of news.
10 
Table 1 displays details regarding the Japanese news surprises.
11 The table shows 
the number of non-zero news surprises, the announcement frequency, and the start date of 
each of the Japanese news variable series.
12 
The timing of economic upturns and downturns for the U.S. follows the Business 
Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Business cycle 
dating for Japan is set in accordance with peaks and troughs of  the Japanese industrial 
production index. Peaks (troughs) are identified as the highest (lowest) level of industrial 
production during an economic expansion (contraction).
13 Table 2 shows the dates for 
                                                 
10  A  standardized  news  surprise  is  given  by  the  unexpected  component  of  the  macroeconomic 
announcement divided by the associated sample standard deviation. Let  t q A ,  denote the value of a given 
macroeconomic fundamental q, announced at time (minute) t. Let  t q E ,  refer to the median value of the 
preceding market expectations for the  given fundamental at announcement time t, and let  q  ˆ  denote the 
sample standard deviation of all the surprise components associated with fundamental q. The standardized 
surprise  of  macroeconomic  fundamental  q  announced  at  time  t  is  then  defined  as  
  q t q t q t q E A S  ˆ , , ,   . 
11 The Bank of Japan website at  www.boj.or.jp/en/theme/stat/index.htm and the Japanese Cabinet Office 
website  at  www.cao.go.jp/index-e.html  provide  additional details (in English) regarding the Japanese 
macro announcements. Details regarding the U.S. news surprises are described in Andersen et al. (2003, p. 
43) and not shown here for brevity. 
12  Table 1 shows considerable variation in start dates acros s the Japanese news variables. A similar 
variation is found in the start dates across the U.S. news variables analyzed in Andersen et al. (2003, p.43). 
13 Japanese business cycles identified using the Japanese industrial production index correlate closely w ith 
business cycles identified using the Composite Coincident Business Cycle Index from the Government of 
Japan Cabinet Office (―Indexes of Business Conditions‖).  
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each of the four U.S. and Japan business cycle combinations. As the table shows, there is 
no  part  of  our  sample  which  encompasses  a  Japanese  upturn  coincident  with  a  U.S. 
downturn, i.e. our sample period encompasses only three business cycle combinations. 
 
3.  Econometric Methodology 
We model the response of the 5-minute JPY/USD exchange rate return, Rt, as a linear 
function of J lagged values of the return itself and K lags of each of the Q news variables, 
t q S , : 
(1)   
  








k t q k q j t j t S R R
1 1 0
, , 0     , t = 1, …, T 
where T = 611,239, Q = 35 (19 U.S. and 16 Japanese news), and J and K are chosen 
according to the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criteria (SBIC). 
We estimate Equation (1) using three different methodologies. For our baseline 
estimations, we only include observations within 10-minutes before and 90-minutes after 
each announcement. We estimate our baseline models using HAC standard errors, thus 
accommodating  the  long  memory  and  the  intraday  periodicity  that  characterize  our 
intraday JPY/USD exchange rate series. 
The second methodology that we employ to estimate Equation (1) includes all 
observations in our sample. The objective is to ensure that limiting the sample to include 
only  the  100-minute  windows  around  the  macro  announcements  does  not  affect  the 
results.  Finally,  we  employ  the  two-step  weighted  least  squares  (2WLS)  estimation 
procedure. This approach enables us to directly estimate the volatility pattern of our data. 
  More specifically, in our 2WLS methodology, we first estimate Equation (1) by  
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OLS and obtain the estimated residuals t  ˆ . The next step is to model the volatility pattern 
using the absolute value of the estimated residuals of Equation (1). We follow Andersen 
et al. (2007) and use the following parameterization: 
























ˆ ˆ       
where I’ = 9 lags of the absolute value of the estimated residuals (accounting for serial 
correlation, or ARCH effects), D = 38 dummies capturing the well-documented intraday 
volatility  pattern,  and  the  last  summation  reflects  dummy  variables  for  each  of  the 
announcement surprises up to a lag length of J’ = 14. In the last step, we use the fitted 
residuals from Equation (2) to perform a WLS estimation of Equation (1). 
Comparing  the  WLS  results  to  the  results  of  our  HAC  baseline  estimations 
ensures that there is no substantial precision lost in the coefficient estimates stemming 
from the baseline estimation procedure.  
In  order  to  analyze  whether  macro  surprises  have  asymmetric  effects  across 
different stages of the business cycle, we first let  i t  for i = A, …, D denote each of the 
four possible business cycle combinations coincident for the U.S. and Japan as follows: 
  A t : Japan and U.S. upturn; 
  B t : Japan and U.S. downturn; 
  C t : Japan upturn and U.S. downturn; 
  D t : Japan downturn and U.S. upturn. 
  We  then  estimate  the  following  equation  separately  across  the  business  cycle 
combinations during which we have a sufficient number of non-zero macro surprises to 
make the estimations meaningful:  
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(3)   
  








k t q k q j t j t S R R
1 1 0
, , 0     , for  i t t   and i = A, …, D. 
Subsequently, we also extend our analysis to allow for the possibility that positive 
surprises (i.e. better than expected economic news) have a different impact than negative 
surprises (i.e. worse than expected economic news). We test whether this is the case by 
first defining  t q
Pos
t q S S , ,   if  0 ,  t q S  (and 0 otherwise), and  t q
Neg
t q S S , ,   if  0 ,  t q S  (and 0 
otherwise) and, in turn, estimating the following equation: 



























, , 0       
where the superscripts Pos and Neg denote positive and negative surprises, respectively. 
 
4.  Results  
4. 1   Country of Origin Asymmetries  
We  first  investigate  whether  similar  US  and  Japanese  macro  news  influences  the 
exchange  rate  differently.  The  first  column  of  Table  3  displays  the  results  of  our 
preliminary  regression  model  described  in  Equation  (1),  including  only  observations 
within the 10-minute ―windows‖ before and the 90-minute ―windows‖ after each of the 
announcements and using HAC standard errors. We set J = 2 and K = 0 according to 
SBIC, i.e. we include as explanatory variables two lags of the exchange rate return and 
only the contemporaneous value of each of the 35 (19 U.S. and 16 Japanese) standardized 
news variables. 
For  the  U.S.  news  variables  our  results  show  that  12  of  the  19  variables  are 
significant and of the correct sign. The magnitudes of the coefficient estimates suggest 
that news surprises regarding non-farm payroll employment and trade balance are the two  
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most influential types of U.S. macro surprises. This is consistent with existing studies of 
U.S. macro surprises and the JPY/USD exchange rate. Furthermore, we find that a news 
surprise regarding GDP is the third most influential type of U.S. macro news.
14 
  Turning to the Japanese macro news estimates from our baseline model, Table 3 
shows that 6 of the 16 Japanese macro news variables are significant and of the correct 
sign. The two most influential Japanese news surprises are news regarding Japanese GDP 
(annualized) and the TANKAN large manufacturing index. According to the magnitude 
of the estimated  coefficients, these two types of Japanese news a ppear less influential 
than news surprises regarding the two most influent ial types of  U.S. news, but more 
influential than any other type of U.S. news, including news regarding U.S. GDP.
15 
  Figures  2  and  3  display  the  coefficient  estimates  from  the significant  news 
variables for the U.S. and Japan, respectively.
16 
To get a sense of the relative influence of broad categories of U.S. and Japanese 
news, we group our news variables into seven categories and investigate the relative 
magnitude  of  the  effects:  GDP,  real  activity  (RA),  consumption  (CONS),  investment 
(INV), net exports (NETEX), prices (P), forward looking (FL), and monetary news (M)
17. 
                                                 
14 This is in contrast to Andersen et al. (2003) who detect no impact of U.S. GDP surprises on the JPY/USD 
exchange rate. However, given that our sample starts after theirs ends, it is not surprising to find some 
variation in the set of influential U.S. and Japanese macro news. See Faust et al. (2005) for a discussion of 
the time-dependence of macro news. 
15 Andersen et al.  (2003) conjecture that their  generally insignificant results regarding the influence of 
German news surprises on the intraday DEM/USD exchange rate may be attributable to the ―uncertain‖, i.e. 
not pre-scheduled, release time of German macro announcements. By contrast, the exact timing of Japanese 
announcements  is  mostly  predictable.  Consequently,  our  significant  results  regarding  the  influence  of 
Japanese news surprises lend some credibility to this conjecture. 
16 To ease the comparison of  the effects of U.S. and Japanese  news surprises, the coefficient estimates 
associated with the Japanese news in Figure 3 are multiplied by negative one. 
17 The groupings are as follows. GDP consists, obviously, of news regarding GDP for both the U .S. and 
Japan. RA consists of non-farm payroll, industrial production, capacity utilization, personal income, and 
consumer credit for the U.S., and large retail sales, industrial production and capacity utilization for Japan. 
CONS consists of consumer spending and new home sales for the  U.S., and overall spending for Japan. 
INV  consists  of  durable  goods  orders,  factory  orders,  and  business  inventories  for  the  U.S.,  and  
 
13 
Figure 4 shows the average news effect for each category. The average news effect is the 
simple average of the significant coefficient estimates within each news category. While 
U.S. and Japanese GDP news, consumption news (CONS) and price news (PA) have very 
similar average impacts on the exchange rate, the exchange rate clearly responds respond 
asymmetrically  depending  on  country  of  origin  in  regards  real  activity  news  (RA), 
investment news (INV), net export news (NETEX), and forward looking news (FL).  
Considering  the  limited  ability  of  the  Bank  of  Japan  to  endogenously  adjust 
interest rates in response to news, it is interesting to notice that forward looking news 
matters more when emanating from Japan. Normally, forward looking news variables are 
particularly likely to elicit an endogenous policy response (since monetary policy is in 
itself forward looking), thereby partially off-setting the exchange rate response to such 
news. However, as our results suggest, when the monetary authority is restricted in the 
extent to which it can respond to news, the exchange rate response to forward looking 
news is more pronounced. 
The second and third columns of Table 3 display the results of our methodology 
robustness checks. The second column pertains to the alternative model that includes all 
the available data of the sample (as opposed to the baseline model which utilizes only the 
100-minute windows around the announcements). The third column pertains to the WLS 
estimation  procedure  described  in  the  previous  section.  Comparing  the  coefficient 
estimates across the three columns, it is evident that the results obtained using the three 
                                                                                                                                                 
construction orders for Japan. NETEX consists of trade balance for the U.S., and trade balance, current 
account and retail trade for Japan. P consists of producer price index and consumer price index for the U.S., 
and consumer price index for Japan. FL consists of consumer confidence index, NAPM index, housing 
starts, and index of leading indicators for the U.S., and leading economic index, consumer confidence, 
TANKAN large manufacturing index, and TANKAN non-manufacturing index for Japan. M consists of 
target federal funds rate for the U.S., and monetary base for Japan.  
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different  methodologies  are  practically  identical.  In  other  words,  our  methodology  is 
proven to be very robust. 
In order to get a sense of the overall explanatory power of the Japanese news 
surprises relative to the U.S. news surprises, we estimate Equation (1) separately with 
only  U.S.  news  variables  included  and  separately  with  only  Japanese  news  variables 
included as explanatory variables. Table 4 presents the results. For the model including 
only the U.S. variables, the same 12 news variables as before are significant and of the 
correct  sign.  For  the  model  including  only  the  Japanese  variables,  the  same  6  news 
variables as before are significant and of the correct sign. In addition, the Japanese news 
variable  Retail  Trade  is  now  marginally  significant  and  of  the  correct  sign.  More 
importantly, the R
2 of the model incorporating only U.S. news variables is 11.05% while 
the R
2 of the model incorporating only Japanese news variables is practically the same at 
11.97%.
18 This suggests that, overall, the Japanese macro news are as i mportant as the 
U.S. macro news.  
This is an interesting finding. On the one hand, our results show that focusing on 
only U.S. news when modeling the JPY/USD exchange rate literally misses half the 
story. On the other hand , our results  also suggest that Japanese and U.S. news are 
sufficiently uncorrelated that disregarding the former does not invalidate the estimated 
effects of the latter, thereby confirming the results and the credibility of studies focusing 
on only U.S. news. 
 
 
                                                 
18 In order to make the R
2 comparison meaningful, the results displayed in Table 4 are based on time-series 
estimations that include all sample observations rather than the ―windows‖ approach used for the baseline 
model estimations displayed in Table 3.  
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4.2  Business Cycle State Dependence 
There are, in principle, four possible business cycle combinations coincident for the U.S. 
and Japan: Japan and U.S. upturn (denoted  A t  in Equation 3); Japan and U.S. downturn 
(denoted  B t  in Equation 3); Japan upturn and U.S. downturn (denoted  C t  in Equation 3); 
and Japan downturn and U.S. upturn (denoted  D t  in Equation 3). However, as noted 
earlier, there is no part of our sample which encompasses a Japanese upturn coincident 
with a U.S. downturn ( C t ), i.e. our sample period encompasses only three business cycle 
combinations.  Moreover, we  have  too  few  observations  (non-zero news  surprises) on 
sample  B t  (coincident U.S. and Japan downturn during April 2001 to November 2001) to 
carry out a meaningful model estimation. As a result, we concentrate our investigation of 
asymmetric  effects  on  the  remaining  two  business  cycle  combinations  of  Japan 
upturn/U.S. upturn ( A t ) and Japan downturn/U.S. upturn ( D t ).  
Table 5 shows the results of the model estimated over the two different Japan-
U.S.  business  cycle  combinations,  as  described  by  Equation  (3).  For  the  Japan 
upturn/U.S. upturn sub-sample the table shows that 10 of the U.S. news variables and 8 
of the Japanese news variables are significant and of the correct sign. Again, the most 
influential news variables are U.S. non-farm payroll employment, U.S. trade balance, 
Japanese GDP, and Japanese TANKAN large manufacturing index. 
The Japan downturn/U.S. upturn combination results show that only 6 of the U.S. 
news  variables  and  only  3  of  the  Japanese  news  variables  are  significant  and  of  the 
correct sign, i.e. it appears the exchange rate is responsive to a smaller set of news when 
the Japanese economy is in a downturn. On the one hand, this is surprising considering 
that the possibility of an endogenous Japanese monetary policy response is constrained  
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by the zero-interest rate bound during an economic downturn, thus we would expect 
macro news to have a larger intraday effect on the exchange rate during this sub-sample. 
On  the  other  hand,  three  of  the  four  consistently  most  important  news  variables  are 
associated  with  larger  coefficient  estimates  during  the  Japan  downturn/U.S.  upturn 
compared  to  the  Japan  upturn/U.S.  upturn  results  (the  exception  being  the  Japanese 
TANKAN large manufacturing index). 
Formal tests (t-tests) of symmetry cannot reject that the influence of any given 
U.S. news variable is different across the two Japan-U.S. business cycle combinations. 
By contrast, of the eight Japanese news variables that are significant in at least one of the 
two business  cycle  combinations, four of those  (TANKAN non-manufacturing index, 
Construction Orders, Retail  Trade, and CPI)  are associated with  coefficient estimates 
where  simple  t-tests  reject  the  null  of  symmetry,  thereby  further  supporting  that 
asymmetries in the exchange rate response to Japanese news across different Japanese 
business cycles are present in the data.
19 
It is noteworthy  that our data facilitates a ―clean‖ comparison  of the intraday 
JPY/USD exchange rate response to news across both a Japanese business cycle upturn 
and a Japanese business cycle downturn due to the fact  that the U.S.  business  cycle 
remains the same, i.e. we vary the state of the Japanese business cycle while holding 
constant the state of the U.S. business cycle.
 20 
 
                                                 







2]. T-stats discussed in this and the subsequent section are not shown for 
brevity but available from the authors upon request. 
20  As  noted  earlier,  we  do  not  have  the  data  necessary  for  testing  whether  the  described  variation  in 
exchange rate responses across the Japanese business cycle is contingent on a U.S. business cycle upturn or 
if our results are applicable regardless of the state of the U.S. economy.  
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4.3   Asymmetric Responses to Positive and Negative Surprises 
As noted earlier, other studies generally find some evidence of asymmetric responses to 
U.S. news surprises. In particular, negative surprises about the U.S. economy tend to 
have a greater impact than positive surprises. In this section we analyze whether the same 
result holds true for Japanese news surprises during the zero interest rate period. In order 
to do so, we estimate Equation (4), which, as previously noted, is an extension of our 
regression model that allows positive surprises to have a different coefficient estimate 
than negative surprises. We expect a greater impact when Japanese news is ―bad‖ given 
the limited scope for conducting counter-cyclical actions to offset the news effect on the 
economy (and the exchange rate) during the zero-interest rate period. Table 6 presents the 
results. 
Contrary to our priors,  the asymmetries across positive  and negative Japanese 
news  surprises  appear  very  modest  and  unsystematic.  We  find  an  equal  number  of 
significant  coefficients  of  the  expected  sign  associated  with  negative  and  positive 
Japanese surprises (7 of each). The average absolute economic impacts of negative and 
positive  Japanese  surprises  are  practically  identical  (0.0365  for  negative  Japanese 
surprises  versus  0.0370  for  positive  ones).  Three  Japanese  news  variables  (Monetary 
Base,  Retail  Trade,  and  Overall  Spending)  are  associated  with  coefficient  estimates 
where formal tests (t-tests) reject the null of symmetry across the positive versus negative 
news surprises. However, only in the case of Retail Trade news is the effect (in absolute 
terms) of negative news larger than that of positive news. Overall, these results do not 
support the idea that the exchange rate responds asymmetrically across ―good‖ and ―bad‖ 
Japanese news.  
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Consistent with other studies, however, we do find some evidence that negative 
surprises about the U.S. economy tend to have larger effects than positive U.S. surprises. 
There  are  slightly  more  significant  coefficients  of  the  expected  sign  associated  with 
negative U.S. surprises than with positive surprises (11 versus 9). The average absolute 
effect of a negative U.S. surprise is 0.0403 compared to the average absolute effect of a 
positive surprise is 0.0342. Three U.S. news variables (GDP, CPI, and Housing Starts) 
are associated with coefficient estimates where t-tests reject the null of symmetry across 
the (in absolute terms) smaller effect of positive versus negative news surprises. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
Our investigation considers possible asymmetric responses of the intraday exchange rate 
to macroeconomic news announcements. We address this issue by jointly investigating 
the intraday  JPY/USD exchange rate responses  to  U.S.  and Japanese macroeconomic 
news surprises over the 1 January 1999 to 31 October 2006 time-period. Asymmetric 
exchange  rate  responses  to  news  seem  particularly  likely  to  appear  in  economic  and 
institutional settings such as the zero interest rate environment of Japan. When lower 
interest  rates  (below  zero)  are  not  feasible,  endogenous  policy  reactions  to 
macroeconomic shocks are constrained. Given the close linkages between interest rates 
and  exchange  rates,  these  constraints,  in  turn,  are  likely  to  make  the  exchange  rate 
response to news asymmetric. 
We discuss several asymmetries that may occur during the Japanese zero interest 
rate regime.  First,  we consider  whether U.S. and Japanese macro news influence the 
exchange rate differently. Our results show that for several types of news the exchange  
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rate responds asymmetrically depending on country origin of news. Consistent with our 
priors, we find that forward-looking news is especially important when emanating from 
the  country  where  the  monetary  authority  is  restricted  in  the  extent  to  which  it  can 
respond to shocks. We also compare the overall influence of Japanese news to the overall 
influence of U.S. news, and we show that Japanese macro news are as important as U.S. 
macro news in influencing the JPY/USD exchange rate.  
Second, we consider whether the exchange rate effects of news surprises vary 
with different stages of the business cycle. Our results provide evidence of asymmetries 
in the exchange rate response to Japanese news across different Japanese business cycle 
stages, consistent with the idea that an institutional setting that limits the possibility of 
endogenous policy responses to news makes asymmetries more likely. 
Third,  we  investigate  whether  ―good‖  and  ―bad‖  news  exert  similar  intraday 
effects (in absolute terms) on the exchange rate. We find no clear evidence of asymmetric 
effects across positive and negative Japanese news surprises. This is a surprising finding, 
considering  that  endogenous  policy  responses  to  positive  Japanese  news  are  possible 
while endogenous policy responses to negative Japanese news are not.  
By contrast, we find some evidence of asymmetric effects across positive and 
negative U.S. news surprises. This finding is not in itself surprising as it conforms with 
the existing literature on U.S. news and exchange rates. However, in light of the previous 
finding - that positive-negative asymmetries are not present in the Japanese news even 
though  such asymmetries  would seem  particularly likely during the zero interest  rate 
period under study - this could indicate that asymmetries in regards to positive versus 
negative  news  particularly  pertains  to  U.S.  news.  Additional  research  investigating  
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exchange rate responses to both positive and negative U.S. and non-U.S. news in other 
currency markets is warranted in order to address whether this is generally the case. 
Overall our results illustrate the necessity of taking into account the country of 
origin of news, business cycle asymmetries, and the direction of news, in order to more 
accurately assess the intraday exchange rate responses to macroeconomic news surprises. 
This  seems  particularly  important  in  contexts  where  institutional  settings  limit  the 





Almeida,  Alvaro;  Charles  Goodhart  and  Richard  Payne  (1998):  ―The  Effects  of 
Macroeconomic  News  on  High  Frequency  Exchange  Rate  Behavior‖,  Journal  of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 33, 383-408. 
 
Andersen,  Torben  G.  and  Tim  Bollerslev  (1998):  ―Deutsche  Mark-Dollar  Volatility: 
Intraday  Activity  Patterns,  Macroeconomic  Announcements,  and  Longer-Run 
Dependencies‖, Journal of Finance 53, 219-265. 
 
Andersen, Torben G.; Tim Bollerslev; Francis X. Diebold and Clara Vega (2003): ―Micro 
Effects of Macro Announcements: Real-Time Price Discovery in  Foreign Exchange‖, 
American Economic Review 93, 38-62. 
 
Andersen, Torben G.; Tim Bollerslev; Francis X. Diebold and Clara Vega (2007): ―Real-
Time Price Discovery in Global Stock, Bond and Foreign Exchange Markets‖, Journal of 
International Economics 73, 251-277. 
 
Basistha, Arabinda and Alexander Kurov (2008): ―Macroeconomic cycles and the stock 
market‘s reaction to monetary policy,‖ Journal of Banking and Finance 32, 2606–2616.  
 
Bauwens,  Luc;  Ben  Omrane,  Walid  and  Pierre  Giot  (2005):  ―News  Announcements, 
Market Activity and Volatility in the Euro/Dollar Foreign Exchange Market‖, Journal of 
International Money and Finance 24, 1108-1125. 
 
Bollerslev, Tim and Ian Domowitz (1993): ―Trading Patterns and Prices in the Interbank 
Foreign Exchange Market‖, Journal of Finance 48, 1421-1443. 
 
Cai, Jun; Yan-Leung Cheung; Raymond S.K. Lee and Michael Melvin (2001): ―Once-In-
A-Generation‘ Yen Volatility in  1998:  Fundamentals,  Intervention, and Order  Flow‖, 
Journal of International Money and Finance 20, 327-347. 
 
Chaboud, Alain P.; Sergey V. Chernenko; Edward Howorka; Raj S. Krishnasmi Iyer; 
David  Liu  and  Jonathan  H.  Wright  (2004):  ―The  High-Frequency  Effects  of  U.S. 
Macroeconomic Data Releases on Prices and Trading Activity in the Global Interdealer 
Foreign  Exchange  Market‖,  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System, 
International Finance Discussion Papers No. 823.  
 
Clarida, Richard and Daniel Waldman (2007): ―Is Bad News about Inflation Good News 
for the Exchange Rate?‖, NBER Working Paper No. 13010. 
 
Dacorogna, Michel M.; Ulrich A. Müller; Robert J. Nagler; Richard B. Olsen and Olivier 
V. Pictet (1993): ―A Geographical Model for the Daily and Weekly Seasonal Volatility in 




Dominguez, Kathryn; and Freyan Panthaki (2006): ―What Defines ‗News‘ in Foreign 
Exchange Markets?‖, Journal of International Money and Finance 25, 168-198. 
 
Engel, Charles; Nelson C. Mark and Kenneth D. West (2007): ―Exchange Rate Models 
Are Not as Bad as You Think‖, NBER Working Paper No. 13318. 
 
Fatum, Rasmus and Barry Scholnick (2008): ―Monetary Policy News and Exchange Rate 
Responses: Do Only Surprises Matter?, Journal of Banking and Finance, 32, 1076-1086. 
 
Faust, Jon; John H. Rogers; Shing-Yi Wang and Jonathan H. Wright (2005): ―The High-
Frequency  Response  of  Exchange  Rates  and  Interest  Rates  to  Macroeconomic 
Announcements‖, Journal of Monetary Economics 54, 1051-1068. 
 
Flannery,  Mark  and  Aris  A.  Protopapadakis  (2002):  ―Macroeconomic  Factors  Do 
Influence Aggregate Stock Returns‖, The Review of Financial Studies, 15 (3), 751-782. 
 
Goodhart, Charles; Takatoshi Ito and Richard Payne (1996): ―One Day in June 1993: A 
Study  of  the  Working  of  the  Reuters  2000-2  Electronic  Foreign  Exchange  Trading 
System‖  in  Jeffrey  A.  Frankel;  Giampaolo  Galli  and  Alberto  Giovannini,  eds.,  The 
Microstructure  of  Foreign  Exchange  Markets,  107-179.  University  of  Chicago  Press, 
Chicago. 
 
Ito,  Takatoshi  and  V.  Vance  Roley  (1987):  ―News  from  the  U.S.  and  Japan.  Which 
Moves the Yen/Dollar Exchange Rate?‖, Journal of Monetary Economics 19, 255-277. 
 
McQueen,  Grant  and  V.  Vance  Roley  (1993):  ―Stock  Prices,  News,  and  Business 
Conditions‖, Review of Financial Studies 6, 683-707. 
 
Melvin,  Michael  and  Xixi  Yin  (2000):  ―Public  Information  Arrival,  Exchange  Rate 
Volatility, and Quote Frequency,‖ The Economic Journal 110, 644-661.  
 
23 


















GDP Quarterly  39  03/12/99  Quarterly  Irregular 
GDP Annually  25  09/17/03  Quarterly  8.50 AM 
 
Real Activity 
Large Retail Sales  78  12/15/99  Monthly  8.50 AM 
Industrial Production  116  05/17/00  Monthly  Irregular 
Capacity Utilization  53  03/15/02  Monthly  1.30 PM 
 
Consumption 
Overall Spending  7  03/31/06  Monthly  8.50 AM 
 
Investment 
Construction Orders  75  03/01/00  Monthly  2.00 PM 
 
Net exports 
Trade Balance  34  09/12/02  Monthly  8.50 AM 
Current Account  79  01/18/99  Monthly  8.50 AM 
Retail Trade  60  02/26/01  Monthly  Irregular 
 
Prices 
Consumer Price Index  37  09/28/01  Monthly  Irregular 
 
Forward Looking 
Leading Economic Index  73  12/06/99  Monthly  2.00 PM 
Consumer Confidence Index  42  03/23/02  Monthly  Irregular 
TANKAN Large Manufacturing  17  12/12/01  Quarterly  8.50 AM 
TANKAN Non-Manufacturing  14  04/01/02  Quarterly  Irregular 
 
Monetary Policy 
Monetary Base  45  10/02/02  Monthly  8.50 AM 
 
Notes:  
a)  Data Sources: Bank of Japan, Japanese Cabinet Office, and Bloomberg News Service 
b)  Sample period: 1 January 1999 to 31 October 2006 
c)  While our sample period starts 1 January 1999, some of the announcement series under study are 
  not tracked by Bloomberg News Service and/or data on surveys of market expectations are not 
  available until later in the sample. The starting date denotes when the first announcement and 
  associated survey are available for a given announcement series. The announcement time of an 
  announcement is denoted irregular if the announcement time changes during the sample period.  
d)  Additional details are available from the authors upon request.  
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A  Upturn  Upturn  January 1999 to December 2000 
  Upturn  Upturn  February 2002 to October 2006 
 
B  Upturn  Downturn  No observations 
 
C  Downturn  Upturn  January 2001 to March 2001 
  Downturn  Upturn  December 2001 to January 2002 
 
D  Downturn  Downturn  April 2001 to November 2001 
       
 
Notes: 
a)  U.S. business cycle definitions in accordance with the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the  
  National Bureau of Economic Research. 
b)  Japanese business cycle definitions based on the Japanese industrial production index and the 




Table 3: Preliminary Regression with Three Different Methodologies 
Sample:
Estimation Procedure:
U.S. Announcements S.E. S.E. S.E.
GDP 0.0410 *** (0.0056) 0.0415 *** (0.0055) 0.0397 *** (0.0037)
Nonfarm payroll employment 0.1172 *** (0.0207) 0.1179 *** (0.0207) 0.1193 *** (0.0043)
Industrial production 0.0066 (0.0052) 0.0071 (0.0051) 0.0077 (0.0054)
Capacity utilization 0.0122 ** (0.0057) 0.0121 ** (0.0057) 0.0121 * (0.0069)
Personal income 0.0034 (0.0034) 0.0033 (0.0034) 0.0030 (0.0035)
Consumer credit -0.0029 (0.0018) -0.0028 (0.0018) -0.0024 (0.0036)
Consumer spending 0.0122 *** (0.0041) 0.0122 *** (0.0041) 0.0117 *** (0.0037)
New home sales 0.0103 * (0.0053) 0.0103 ** (0.0052) 0.0097 *** (0.0036)
Durable goods orders 0.0235 *** (0.0064) 0.0241 *** (0.0065) 0.0237 *** (0.0038)
Factory orders 0.0036 (0.0056) 0.0043 (0.0056) 0.0039 (0.0038)
Business inventories -0.0046 (0.0039) -0.0042 (0.0039) -0.0043 (0.0037)
Trade balance 0.0739 *** (0.0109) 0.0741 *** (0.0107) 0.0716 *** (0.0045)
Producer price index 0.0094 ** (0.0046) 0.0091 * (0.0046) 0.0097 *** (0.0037)
Consumer price index 0.0042 (0.0067) 0.0043 (0.0067) 0.0045 (0.0037)
Consumer confidence index 0.0363 *** (0.0049) 0.0369 *** (0.0050) 0.0366 *** (0.0038)
NAPM index 0.0329 *** (0.0050) 0.0327 *** (0.0050) 0.0332 *** (0.0036)
Housing starts 0.0083 ** (0.0039) 0.0080 ** (0.0039) 0.0094 ** (0.0037)
Index of leading indicators 0.0090 ** (0.0037) 0.0089 ** (0.0036) 0.0093 ** (0.0037)
Target federal funds rate -0.0009 *** (0.0001) -0.0016 *** (0.0000) -0.0009 (0.0067)
Japanese Announcements S.E. S.E. S.E.
Trade balance -0.0053 (0.0038) -0.0056 (0.0038) -0.0052 (0.0065)
Current account -0.0047 (0.0037) -0.0049 (0.0037) -0.0048 (0.0042)
Leading economic index 0.0016 (0.0045) 0.0014 (0.0043) 0.0000 (0.0036)
Consumer confidence index 0.0038 (0.0037) 0.0035 (0.0036) 0.0028 (0.0056)
TANKAN large manufacturing index -0.0611 *** (0.0176) -0.0618 *** (0.0175) -0.0576 *** (0.0077)
TANKAN non-manufacturing index -0.0083 (0.0131) -0.0085 (0.0131) -0.0063 (0.0079)
Monetary base -0.0047 (0.0040) -0.0043 (0.0038) -0.0044 (0.0053)
Capacity utilization -0.0070 (0.0116) -0.0065 (0.0112) -0.0038 (0.0135)
GDP (quarterly) -0.0239 *** (0.0067) -0.0235 *** (0.0065) -0.0231 *** (0.0078)
GDP (annual) -0.0635 *** (0.0189) -0.0647 *** (0.0187) -0.0639 *** (0.0105)
Large retail sales 0.0013 (0.0039) 0.0013 (0.0038) 0.0009 (0.0043)
Construction orders -0.0019 (0.0042) -0.0019 (0.0040) -0.0014 (0.0073)
Industrial production -0.0191 *** (0.0033) -0.0186 *** (0.0032) -0.0178 *** (0.0030)
Retail trade -0.0108 (0.0066) -0.0099 (0.0064) -0.0077 (0.0055)
Consumer price index -0.0087 *** (0.0029) -0.0084 *** (0.0029) -0.0091 ** (0.0044)





















OLS with HAC S.E.
All sample
OLS with HAC S.E.
Coef. Coef.
 
Statistics associated with the constant and the first two lags of the dependent variable are omitted for space 
considerations and are available upon request. Standard errors are given in parenthesis. The symbols *, **, 




Table 4: U.S. Macro Surprises Only and Japanese Macro Surprises Only Regressions 
Sample:
Estimation Procedure:
U.S. Announcements S.E. S.E.
GDP 0.0411 *** (0.0056) -
Nonfarm payroll employment 0.1171 *** (0.0207) -
Industrial production 0.0066 (0.0052) -
Capacity utilization 0.0122 ** (0.0057) -
Personal income 0.0035 (0.0034) -
Consumer credit -0.0029 (0.0018) -
Consumer spending 0.0122 *** (0.0041) -
New home sales 0.0104 ** (0.0053) -
Durable goods orders 0.0235 *** (0.0064) -
Factory orders 0.0037 (0.0056) -
Business inventories -0.0046 (0.0039) -
Trade balance 0.0739 *** (0.0109) -
Producer price index 0.0094 ** (0.0046) -
Consumer price index 0.0042 (0.0067) -
Consumer confidence index 0.0363 *** (0.0049) -
NAPM index 0.0329 *** (0.0050) -
Housing starts 0.0083 ** (0.0039) -
Index of leading indicators 0.0090 ** (0.0037) -
Target federal funds rate -0.0010 *** (0.0001) -
Japanese Announcements S.E. S.E.
Trade balance - -0.0052 (0.0038)
Current account - -0.0049 (0.0037)
Leading economic index - 0.0016 (0.0045)
Consumer confidence index - 0.0039 (0.0037)
TANKAN large manufacturing index - -0.0611 *** (0.0175)
TANKAN non-manufacturing index - -0.0084 (0.0131)
Monetary base - -0.0046 (0.0041)
Capacity utilization - -0.0071 (0.0119)
GDP (quarterly) - -0.0243 *** (0.0067)
GDP (annual) - -0.0630 *** (0.0188)
Large retail sales - 0.0013 (0.0040)
Construction orders - -0.0017 (0.0043)
Industrial production - -0.0189 *** (0.0034)
Retail trade - -0.0111 * (0.0066)
Consumer price index - -0.0089 *** (0.0029)






















































Statistics associated with the constant and the first two lags of the dependent variable 
are omitted for space considerations and are available upon request. Standard errors 
are  given  in  parenthesis.  The  symbols  *,  **,  and  ***  denote  that  the  individual 
coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level respectively.  
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U.S. Announcements S.E. S.E.
GDP 0.0470 *** (0.0073) 0.0319 *** (0.0083)
Nonfarm payroll employment 0.1210 *** (0.0324) 0.1891 *** (0.0298)
Industrial production 0.0054 (0.0069) 0.0055 (0.0200)
Capacity utilization 0.0117 (0.0082) 0.0190 (0.0162)
Personal income 0.0055 * (0.0031) -0.0044 (0.0123)
Consumer credit -0.0043 * (0.0026) -0.0025 (0.0033)
Consumer spending 0.0137 ** (0.0053) 0.0092 (0.0081)
New home sales 0.0114 (0.0075) 0.0028 (0.0063)
Durable goods orders 0.0294 *** (0.0085) 0.0163 (0.0137)
Factory orders 0.0035 (0.0090) 0.0081 (0.0070)
Business inventories -0.0053 (0.0050) -0.0073 (0.0109)
Trade balance 0.0624 *** (0.0082) 0.0889 *** (0.0219)
Producer price index 0.0094 * (0.0052) 0.0042 (0.0114)
Consumer price index -0.0055 (0.0081) 0.0132 (0.0140)
Consumer confidence index 0.0386 *** (0.0069) 0.0269 ** (0.0134)
NAPM index 0.0327 *** (0.0068) 0.0206 ** (0.0086)
Housing starts 0.0090 * (0.0053) 0.0079 (0.0062)
Index of leading indicators 0.0084 (0.0068) 0.0139 ** (0.0064)
Target federal funds rate -0.0008 *** (0.0001) -
Japanese Announcements S.E. S.E.
Trade balance -0.0033 (0.0036) -0.0178 (0.0118)
Current account -0.0038 (0.0046) -0.0111 (0.0076)
Leading economic index 0.0002 (0.0031) 0.0018 (0.0057)
Consumer confidence index 0.0005 (0.0050) 0.0070 (0.0055)
TANKAN large manufacturing index -0.0981 *** (0.0327) -0.0635 *** (0.0186)
TANKAN non-manufacturing index -0.0338 ** (0.0133) 0.0247 (0.0247)
Monetary base -0.0037 (0.0044) -0.0028 (0.0092)
Capacity utilization -0.0067 (0.0048) -0.0077 (0.0148)
GDP (quarterly) -0.0210 *** (0.0060) -0.0223 (0.0144)
GDP (annual) -0.0430 ** (0.0214) -0.0835 *** (0.0272)
Large retail sales 0.0050 (0.0059) 0.0009 (0.0113)
Construction orders -0.0106 *** (0.0021) 0.0082 ** (0.0038)
Industrial production -0.0182 *** (0.0036) -0.0236 *** (0.0084)
Retail trade -0.0158 * (0.0082) 0.0064 (0.0084)
Consumer price index -0.0108 *** (0.0035) -0.0014 (0.0035)
Overall spending -0.0070 (0.0095) -
R-squared:





OLS with HAC S.E. OLS with HAC S.E.
Coef. Coef.
100-min. windows 100-min. windows
Japan Upturn Japan Downturn
and U.S. Upturn and U.S. Upturn
 
Statistics associated with the constant and the first two lags of the dependent variable 
are omitted for space considerations and are available upon request. Standard errors 
are  given  in  parenthesis.  The  symbols  *,  **,  and  ***  denote  that  the  individual 





Table 6: Positive and Negative Macro Surprises 
Sample:
Estimation Procedure:
U.S. Announcements S.E. S.E.
GDP 0.0219 *** (0.0049) 0.0612 *** (0.0085)
Nonfarm payroll employment 0.1111 *** (0.0209) 0.1193 *** (0.0271)
Industrial production 0.0122 (0.0076) 0.0017 (0.0077)
Capacity utilization 0.0093 (0.0086) 0.0154 * (0.0083)
Personal income 0.0045 * (0.0025) 0.0008 (0.0107)
Consumer credit -0.0007 (0.0018) -0.0055 * (0.0031)
Consumer spending 0.0081 (0.0052) 0.0176 ** (0.0073)
New home sales 0.0080 (0.0056) 0.0147 (0.0111)
Durable goods orders 0.0153 * (0.0090) 0.0337 *** (0.0069)
Factory orders 0.0129 *** (0.0044) -0.0063 (0.0101)
Business inventories -0.0105 * (0.0054) 0.0022 (0.0057)
Trade balance 0.0633 *** (0.0103) 0.0794 *** (0.0153)
Producer price index 0.0049 (0.0049) 0.0154 * (0.0081)
Consumer price index -0.0111 (0.0098) 0.0144 * (0.0078)
Consumer confidence index 0.0377 *** (0.0071) 0.0345 *** (0.0068)
NAPM index 0.0326 *** (0.0076) 0.0330 *** (0.0073)
Housing starts 0.0026 (0.0048) 0.0196 *** (0.0054)
Index of leading indicators 0.0083 ** (0.0039) 0.0098 (0.0073)
Target federal funds rate -0.0009 *** (0.0001) -0.0009 *** (0.0001)
Japanese Announcements S.E. S.E.
Trade balance -0.0036 (0.0076) -0.0056 (0.0042)
Current account -0.0078 (0.0049) 0.0000 (0.0069)
Leading economic index 0.0055 (0.0049) -0.0039 (0.0031)
Consumer confidence index 0.0051 (0.0061) 0.0030 (0.0045)
TANKAN large manufacturing index -0.0591 * (0.0318) -0.0694 *** (0.0231)
TANKAN non-manufacturing index -0.0058 (0.0295) -0.0117 (0.0157)
Monetary base -0.0199 *** (0.0074) -0.0020 (0.0044)
Capacity utilization -0.0196 *** (0.0058) 0.0082 (0.0181)
GDP (quarterly) -0.0219 *** (0.0059) -0.0317 * (0.0180)
GDP (annual) -0.0465 ** (0.0182) -0.0773 *** (0.0283)
Large retailers sales -0.0049 (0.0043) 0.0071 (0.0053)
Construction orders -0.0032 (0.0047) -0.0014 (0.0054)
Industrial production -0.0182 ** (0.0074) -0.0195 *** (0.0037)
Retail trade 0.0012 (0.0046) -0.0398 *** (0.0135)
Consumer price index -0.0062 (0.0038) -0.0108 ** (0.0046)
Overall spending -0.0735 *** (0.0197) -0.0071 ** (0.0028)
R-squared:









OLS with HAC S.E.
 
Both sets of coefficients are based on the same regression. Standard errors are given 
in  parenthesis.  The  symbols  *,  **,  and  ***  denote  either  that  (1)  the  individual 
coefficient is significant or (2) the null hypothesis is rejected at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance level respectively.  
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Figure 1: Money Market Rate in Japan 
 
             
Note: Call Rate, Uncollateralized Overnight Rate, End of Month. Source: Bank of Japan.  
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  Notes: 
 
  a)  The figure displays the significant coefficient estimates of the  standardized U.S. macro  
    surprises reported in the first column of Table 3.  
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  Notes: 
 
  a)  The figure displays the significant coefficient estimates of the  standardized Japanese  
    macro surprises reported in the first column of Table 3. 
  b)  To ease the comparison of the effects of U.S. and Japanese news surprises, the coefficient 
    estimates associated with the Japanese news displayed in Figure 2 are multiplied by  
    negative one.  
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U.S. Japan  
 
  Notes: 
 
a)  The average news effect is defined as the simple average of the significant coefficient 
estimates within each news category.  
b)  Section 4 provides details on the news categories. 
  c)  To ease the comparison of the effects of U.S. and Japanese news surprises, the coefficient 
    estimates associated with the Japanese news displayed in Figure 3 are multiplied by  
    negative one. 
 
 